Evolutionary game theory has been developed primarily under the implicit assump-8 tion of an infinite population. We rigorously analyze a standard model for the evolution 9 of cooperation (the multi-player snowdrift game) and show that in many situations in 10 which there is a cooperative evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if the population is 11 infinite, there is no cooperative ESS if the population is finite (no matter how large). 12 In these cases, contributing nothing is a globally convergently stable finite-population 13 ESS, implying that apparent evolution of cooperation in such games is an artifact of the 14 infinite population approximation. The key issue is that if the size of groups that play 15 the game exceeds a critical proportion of the population then the infinite-population 16 approximation predicts the wrong evolutionary outcome (in addition, the critical pro-17 portion itself depends on the population size). Our results are robust to the underlying 18 selection process.
; parameter values are L = 10, k = 1, m = 1.5, τ turn = 15. Bottom panel: Fitness is shown for three situations involving groups of n = 2 individuals. (i) Residents cooperate and contribute the ESS N (light green, X res = 9.63) (ii) Residents cooperate but contribute less than the ESS N (medium green, X res = 5). (iii) Residents defect, i.e., contribute nothing (dark green, X res = 0). Resident strategies are indicated by vertical lines in the same colour as the associated fitness function. In the case of defecting residents, a focal individual's fitness function does not depend on the group size (n) and has a local maximum at the maximizing total good (τ max = 19.3, thin grey vertical line).
X * ∞ = τ max n .
(4) ESS N X = X * N satisfying inequality (8) . Moreover, X * N → X * ∞ as N → ∞. 146 While the evolutionarily stable cooperation levels in finite and infinite populations are never 147 exactly the same, theorem 1 shows that the difference is negligible in sufficiently large pop-148 ulations if as the population size N → ∞, groups become a vanishingly small proportion of 149 the population (cf. figure 2) . However, if group size is not sufficiently small relative to the 150 total population size then evolutionary predictions from finite population models differ qual-151 itatively from the predictions for infinite ones: it may actually be impossible for cooperation 152 to evolve at all. This is formalized in the next theorem. 
158 Then m > 0 and there is a critical maximal marginal fitness threshold,
Generically, at least one cooperative local ESS N (X = X * N > 0) exists that is universal and universally locally convergently stable. In addition, defection is (universally) a locally convergently stable ESS N . 
imal marginal fitness (m): Equation (10) gives the critical maximal marginal fitness above 162 which a cooperative ESS N exists, and below which defection is the only ESS N . Theorem 2 163 thus connects the maximal marginal fitness-a property of the fitness function that relates 164 investments in the communal task to fitness benefits-with properties of the population of 165 interacting agents: the population size (N ), the number of players in a group (n), and the 166 number of groups (G = N/n).
167
Equation (10) 
i.e., the number of groups G must be greater than G c , the minimum number of groups that 177 support cooperation in a population of size N (or in groups of n players). For any given 178 number of players in a group (n), if we multiply inequality (12) by n we see that cooperation 179 cannot evolve-i.e., no cooperative ESS N exists-unless the population size is greater than 180 a critical population size ‡ ,
182 Figure 2 illustrates this result for the particular NSG specified by the benefit function shown 183 in figure 1. Put another way, for a given group size n, if the population size N is too small 184 then there is no cooperative ESS N , but if N is sufficiently large then there is a (universal) 185 cooperative ESS N . For any given population size N , there are group sizes n and benefit 186 functions B(τ ) that yield N min > N , so a qualitative difference between the evolutionary 187 outcomes in finite and infinite populations can occur either for small or large population 188 sizes.
189
ESS conditions in relation to group size (n). Rearranging condition (11a) again, we
192 i.e., for cooperation to evolve, the group size n must be less than n c , the maximum size of 193 groups that support cooperation in a population of size N (or a population divided into G 194 ‡ Condition (c) in the definition of the NSG ( §5.1) implies that m > 0, so N min is always well-defined in figure 1 ). For several group sizes (n), the infinite population ESS (X * ∞ , equation (4)) is shown as a horizontal line, and the finite population ESS N (X * N ) is shown with dots as a function of population size N . The vertical line segments indicate the critical population size threshold (N min , inequality (13)). A cooperative ESS N exists if and only if N > N min . 196 i.e., if the number of groups is fixed (and smaller than 1+1/m) then in order for a cooperative 197 ESS N to exist, the population size must be less than the threshold in inequality (15) the threshold m c (exactly the same threshold that appears in equation (10), but expressed 208 here in terms of G rather than n). Suppose now that the population is divided into a given 209 number of groups, G ≥ 2. There must be at least two individuals in each group, so N ≥ 2G 210 and hence G/N ≤ 1/2. Consequently, for any possible population size N , we have
.
212 Therefore, if the benefit function is such that
214 then no cooperative ESS N exists, no matter how large the population size N . Yet, when the 215 game defined by the same cost and benefit functions is played in an infinite population, a 216 cooperative ESS exists (regardless of the group size n). Given G, in the example of the NSG 217 defined using equation (23), it is easy to satisfy inequality (18) since the only constraint on 218 m is that it must be positive.
219
Above, we have considered populations divided into a given number of groups. Alter-220 natively, we could consider groups of a given size (n), and ask whether it is possible for a 221 public goods game to have a cooperative ESS if the population is infinite but no cooperative 222 ESS N for any finite population size. As we show elsewhere, NSGs do not have this property, 223 but there are snowdrift games that do have it (41).
224
Confirmation with both selection and mutation. Lastly, in figure 4 we complement 225 our rigorous analyses with individual-based simulations of finite populations in which indi-226 viduals undergo both selection and mutation (see appendix 5.2 for details). Simulations such 227 § Note that n c is always finite for a given population size, but when the number of groups G is fixed and larger than 1 + 1/m, then there is an ESS N for any number of players n. (23); parameter values are L = 1000, k = 1, m = 0.05, τ turn = 7. For several numbers of groups (G), the infinite population ESS (X * ∞ , equation (4)) is shown as a curve, and the finite population ESS N (X * N ) is shown with dots as a function of population size N . For each number of groups, the minimum population considered is N = G + 1. The vertical line segments indicate the critical population size threshold (N max , inequality (15)), below which a cooperative ESS N exists (in contrast to the situation in which the group size n is fixed and an ESS N exists only above a critical population size; cf. figure 2).
as these confirm that rigorous game-theoretical analyses-which are based on selection acting 228 with only two types in the population-correctly predict evolutionary outcomes in realistic 229 populations in which each individual can, in principle, be playing a different strategy. 230 4 Discussion 231 We have seen that the evolutionary dynamics of the class of natural snowdrift games (NSGs, 232 defined in Methods §5.1) are different when played in finite vs. infinite populations. Since all 233 real populations are finite, it is important to understand how inferences based on infinite-234 population analyses of the multi-player snowdrift game (e.g., (3, 30, 42) ) might be affected.
235
More generally, under what circumstances are infinite-population analyses of the evolution 236 of cooperation likely to lead to invalid inferences about real populations? 237 We have shown that there are games for which it is possible that cooperation can evolve in 238 an infinite population but not in any finite population (no matter how large). This extreme 239 possibility emphasizes that inferences drawn from infinite population analyses should always 240 be regarded cautiously.
241
The infinite-population approximation is likely to predict incorrect evolutionary outcomes 242 if the number of individuals playing the game (the group size, n) is substantial relative to 243 the total population size (N ). Exactly what "substantial" means will depend on the game 244 in question and the population size; we have specified this threshold precisely for NSGs in 245 inequality (14). Evolutionary predictions derived from infinite population analyses can be 246 incorrect for finite populations of any size (figure 2 and theorem 2). The origin of such 247 erroneous inferences is that finite groups (no matter how large) are always negligible in 248 size compared to an infinite underlying population, but not compared to a finite underlying 249 population.
250
Intuition for how different predictions arise in finite and infinite populations can be 251 developed by considering a thought experiment in which the population (of size N ) is si-252 multaneously divided into G groups that play the game. If a single mutant invades the 253 resident population, the probability that a randomly chosen group contains the mutant is 254 1 /G. If the population size were then increased by adding more and more groups of the 255 same size (G → ∞, keeping n fixed), then the effect of the mutant on the residents would 256 be "infinitely diluted" (the mutant would have a negligible effect on residents' fitnesses as 257 N → ∞).
If, instead, the population size were increased by adding individuals to the 258 existing groups (without increasing the number of groups) then the probability that a ran-259 domly selected group contains the mutant would not change; however, in this version of the 260 thought experiment, the limit N → ∞ entails the size of each group also becoming infinitely 261 large.
262
Adaptive dynamics, which has been extensively used in the study of evolutionary dynam-263 ics [e.g., (3, 42, 43) , as well as (44) and references therein], relies on an infinite-population 264 approximation (8). Previous work has presented reasonable arguments to justify this ap-265 proximation (e.g., (35)) and reported general agreement between adaptive dynamics and 266 stochastic simulations of finite populations (see (45) for a review). In addition, specific 267 agreement has been noted (15) between the finite-and infinite-population evolutionary dy-268 namics of the multi-player snowdrift game with discrete strategies. These results appear to 269 contrast those presented here, though (15) did observe that defectors prevail when the group Figure 4 : Individual-based simulations (details in appendix 5.2) of populations playing an NSG with cost and benefit functions as in figure 1 and group size n = 15, for population sizes N = 225 (red), 165 (black) and 120 (grey). The horizontal axis is the number of generations elapsed, and the vertical axis is the strategy (contribution level) of each individual in the population. The strategies present in the population in each generation are plotted on a vertical line intersecting the horizontal axis at the corresponding point. For N = 120, defecting is the unique, globally convergently stable ESS N ; for N > 155, a cooperative ESS N is predicted at X * = 3.54 (marked with a horizontal yellow line). The ESS for an infinite population playing this game is X * ∞ = 3.56. Note in these simulations, the mutation rate is high enough that populations contain more than two strategies at any given generation (in contrast to our rigorous mathematical analysis of dimorphic populations).
can coexist in an infinite population). In other work, there has been a focus on situations in 272 which the group size is much smaller than the population size, which reduces the chance of 273 discovering discrepancies between finite and infinite population evolutionary predictions.
274
Our analysis of the class of natural snowdrift games is rigorous (theorems 1 and 2), and 275 our conditions for existence of a cooperative ESS N are universal (in the sense of being en-276 tirely independent of the selection process). Broadly, our results indicate that approximating 277 large populations by infinite ones may generate misleading conclusions. In particular, infer-278 ences based on adaptive dynamics are not necessarily applicable to real (finite) populations.
279
There is a general need to reevaluate the theoretical justification for approximating large 
298 Thus, the focal individual's fitness is 
but there is a net incremental fitness benefit for contributing τ max /n if other group 311 members contribute that amount,
313 314
In an infinite population, condition (c) implies that τ max /n and 0 are the only local For the purpose of making example graphs and running simulations, we have used sigmoidal 319 benefit functions. The biological motivation for this is that one would expect a nonlinear 320 increase in the ease of passing the barrier as more snow is cleared, but eventually there can 321 be no further benefit from additional work because all the snow has been cleared.
322
Specifically, for any integer k > 0 and real numbers m > 0, L > 0 and τ turn ≥ 0, consider 323 the benefit function 324 325 where erf (x) is the generalized error function (46) of order ,
327 and Γ(x) is the gamma function [equation (50a)]. We analyze this flexible class of sigmoidal 328 benefit functions in appendix B, where we show that the parameters L and τ turn are the 329 horizontal asymptote and the inflection point, respectively, k controls the "width" of the 330 sigmoid ¶ , and m + 1 is the maximal marginal benefit (so that m is the maximal marginal 331 fitness that results from this functional form, justifying our notation).
332 Figure 1 shows the benefit function (23) (23), in appendix B we derive explicit formulae for τ min , τ max , and X * ∞ and X * N (in 336 terms of m, L, τ turn and k).
337
The class of sigmoids based on generalized error functions is much more flexible than 338 the more common "logistic" sigmoid used by (30, 42) (which is based on shifting, and hor-339 izontally and vertically stretching, the hyperbolic tangent function, tanh(x)). Whereas the 340 maximum slope, horizontal asymptote and position of the inflection point uniquely deter-341 mine the "width" of a logistic sigmoid, the generalized error function allows the width to be 342 set independently via the parameter k [see equation (60)].
343 ¶ More precisely, for a given maximal marginal fitness (m) and horizontal asymptote (L), k controls the distance between the benefit function's inflection point (τ turn ) and the total contribution at which the marginal benefit is half of its maximum.
The three individual-based simulations shown in figure 4 [for population sizes N = 120 345 (grey), 165 (black) and 250 (red)] were run using algorithm 1, which we implemented in an 346 R (47) package. In the following description, we denote the normal distribution truncated 347 to the interval (l, u) by TruncNormal (µ, σ, l, u) . It is a assumed that values of the following 348 parameters have been set:
349
• Parameters (k, m, L and τ turn ) of the benefit function (23).
350
• Group size (n) and population size (N ), such that G = N/n is an integer.
351
• Number of repetitions of the NSG between reproductive events (n reps ).
352
• Maximum number of generations to evolve (nGen).
353
• Upper bound for contribution level (x max ). Permute (x 1 , . . . , x N ) randomly assign individuals into groups of size n 8 τ j ← n k=1 x k+(j−1)n , j = 1, . . . , G total contribution in group j Our main results are stated in theorems 1 and 2 ( § 3). Before developing the proofs in detail,
517
it is useful to note that:
518
• τ min > 0 (where τ min is defined in assumption (c) of the definition of the NSG, § 5.1).
519
To see this, suppose that τ min = 0. Then assumption (c) implies that B(τ max ) ≥ τ max , 520 contradicting assumption (d). (25)
533
Suppose, moreover, that a focal individual is selected from the population by first sampling a 534 group of n individuals, and then selecting one of the members of this group. Lastly, suppose 535 for simplicity that individual fitnesses are given by the payoffs from a single round of the 536 NSG played in such randomly selected groups # . We show elsewhere (37, eq. 4.61, p. 137) 537 that the expected difference between the mutant and resident fitnesses is then 
Differentiating with respect to x and setting x = X, we find (37, pp. 138-139)
From these expressions we see that
549
• ∂ x δW (x, X)| x=X is independent of , and 550
• ∂ 2 x δW (x, X)| x=X is linear in .
551
We will exploit these facts below. Proof. B (0) < 1 because B(τ ) − τ decreases for 0 ≤ τ < τ min , so using equation (28a),
563 564
for X sufficiently small. From Theorem 4.3.9 in (37), it follows that X = 0 (defection) 565 is convergently stable, and selection opposes invasion of mutants contributing a sufficiently 566 small but positive amount, x > 0. To establish that X = 0 is evolutionarily stable, observe 567 that equation (29) implies that δW (x, 0) < 0 for sufficiently small x, so such mutants are 568 selected against, regardless of their proportion ( ) in the population. Thus, corollary 5.4 of 569 (31) implies that selection also opposes the fixation of such mutants.
570
Now suppose groups constitute the entire population, i.e., N = n. Then, for any resident 571 strategy X > 0 and any number of mutants M p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, mutants contributing 572 less than residents to the public good (0 ≤ x < X) have a higher payoff than residents; hence 573 defection is the unique ESS N and is globally convergently stable. Defection is also globally 574 evolutionarily stable because for any mutant strategy x > 0 and any number of mutants 575 (M p < N ), residents obtain a higher payoff than mutants (because they receive the same 576 benefit without paying a cost).
577
Inserting equation (28a) into the definition of an evolutionarily singular strategy (definition 579 4.3.5 of (37)) implies that cooperative singular strategies are characterized by equation (5).
580
Any solution of equation (5) must satisfy nX * N ∈ (τ min , τ max ), because the right hand side of 581 equation (5) is greater than 1 and, as noted above, if τ ∈ (τ min , τ max ) then B (τ ) ≤ 1.
582
Necessary condition for ESS N : Suppose that X solves equation (5) 
586 587 so ∂ 2 x δW (x, X)| x=X is increasing in and positive for any ≥ 1/N (i.e., any mixed popu-588 lation). Thus, when mutants play x sufficiently close to X, ∂ x δW (x, X)| x=X is negative for 589
x < X and positive for x > X; hence, since δW (X, X) = 0, we must have δW (x, X) > 0 590
for any x that is near but not equal to X (and this is true for any number of mutants 591 M p = 1, . . . , N − 1). Corollary 5.4 of (31) then implies that selection favours the fixation of 592 such mutants, so X is not an ESS N , regardless of the selection process. Thus, if X * N > 0 is 593 an ESS N then it cannot be that B (nX) > 0, i.e., inequality (7) holds.
594
Sufficient condition for universal ESS N : The sufficient condition for local universal 595 evolutionary and convergent stability follows immediately from theorem 4.D.1 of (37) and 596 equation (28). 
599
Noting that f (τ max /n, 1) = 0 and that 600 ∂ X f (X, y)| (X,y)=(τ max /n,1) = B (τ max ) = 0 , 
604
Now suppose that the group size n is either fixed, or varies with population size but satisfies First, note that X = 0 is always a locally convergently stable ESS N (lemma 3). From 614 Corollary 4.3.8 of (37), selection opposes invasion of a cooperative resident strategy X > 0 615 by sufficiently similar mutant strategies only if X is singular, which (using equation (28a) 
636 a contradiction.
637
Thus B nX * N < 0 and C (X) = 0, so theorems 4.D.1 and 4.3.9 of (37) imply that 638 X * N is a local ESS N and is locally convergently stable.
639
Case m = m c . Suppose, in order to derive a contradiction, that X > 0 is a cooperative 
643
We need to avoid the situation in which singular strategy X * N is also an inflection point of B(nx). This occurs when nX * N is both a critical point and an inflection point of B (x) − (N − 1) x/ (N − n), which is generically not the case. benefit B is not maximal for an interval of total contributions τ ), which happens 645 generically. Then, any total contribution in arg max B (τ ) is a local maximum of B (τ ).
646
It follows that if x < X and x is sufficiently close to X, then
648 and therefore from equation (27), 
654 implies that ∂ x δW (x, X) < 0. Hence, similar to an argument in the proof of theorem 1, 655 since δW (X, X) = 0, we must have δW (x, X) > 0 for any x that is slightly less than 656 but not equal to X (and this is true for any number of mutants M p = 1, . . . , N − 1).
657
Consequently, selection favours the invasion and replacement of X by any such x, so 658 X is not evolutionarily stable.
659
To see that defection is globally evolutionarily stable, substitute X = 0 in equation (27) 660 to get
Noting that for all x > 0, B kx ≤ m c + 1, we have
Then, using equations (27), (46) and equation (4.63) on p.138 of (37), it follows that In this appendix we define the class of sigmoidal benefit functions that we have used to 685 illustrate our results, and derive a variety of analytical formulae that we have found useful 686 when working with these functions. (52) 710 We show below that the inflection point of B (47) is τ turn , and that the maximal marginal 711 fitness given the benefit function B is m.
712
From the integral definition of the generalized error function [equation (48)]
B (τ ) is always positive, and hence B (τ ) is monotonically increasing. However, B (τ ) > 0 725 for τ < τ turn and B (τ ) < 0 for τ > τ turn , and hence
727 so from equation (9), the maximal marginal fitness is 
To find τ max and τ min , we substitute b = B (τ ) = 1 in equation (58) Singular and evolutionarily stable cooperative strategies in finite populations:
756
In a finite population of size N , a singular strategy X * N of the NSG is a solution of equa-757 tion (5), that is,
759 so equation (58) implies that at the ESS, the total contribution must be one of
761 762
There are therefore two singular strategies,
764
Similarly to τ min and τ max , B (nX * N + ) > 0 and B (nX * N − ) < 0, so from theorem 1, the unique
The curvature of the benefit function at the ESS N : Similar to equation (62), we
Condition for the fitness difference having a minimum when a single mutant 776 defects and residents play the ESS: To guarantee that when a single mutant invades a 777 population playing the ESS, the fitness difference has both a minimum and a maximum (as a 778 29 function of the mutant strategy), we need the mutant contribution that minimizes fitness to be positive (or equivalently, the contribution of the nonfocal individuals-all residents-must 780 be less than the minimizing total good τ min ),
782 783
Using equations (59b) and (60) The payoff extrema difference: We now calculate the payoff extrema difference (PED),
791
∆Ψ, that is, the difference between a mutant's local minimum and maximum fitnesses when 792 residents contribute the infinite-population ESS.
796 797 so using equations (60) and (63), we have 798 ∆Ψ = 2L erf 2k 2k log (m + 1) − 4kL (m + 1) Γ 1/(2k) 2k log (m + 1) .
799 800
The mean fitness slope: To choose parameter values that generate a fitness difference 801 with a distinct peak at the ESS (when residents play the ESS), we would like to find the mean 802 fitness slope between the extrema, i.e., the ratio of the PED, ∆Ψ, and the distance between 803 the fitness extrema as a function of our parameters. To that end, using equation (70), the 804 distance between the fitness extrema is 805 τ max n − τ min − n − 1 n τ max = τ max − τ min = ∆τ . .
830 831 We see that the ratio X * ∞ /X * N → 1 as G → ∞ with n fixed. However, X * ∞ /X * N approaches 832 a (finite) value greater than 1 as n → ∞ with G fixed (assuming X * N exist for all N ; see 833 inequality (15)).
In the special case k = 1 (i.e., = 2), since Γ (1/2) = √ π, equation (47) 
862 863 and the mean fitness slope (equation (76)) between the extrema reduces to 864 ∆Ψ ∆τ = m + 1 2 π log (m + 1) erf log (m + 1) − 1 .
